Imagine your psychiatrist offers you a revolutionary treatment for your persistent depression. She walks you through specifics of the drug: the dosage, the risks of a racing heart or perhaps a frightening few hours. Then she tells you something unexpected: she notes that during the session, your sense of self may dissolve, time may lose meaning, you may believe that you meet and/or become God, and you may come out on the other side with fundamentally different beliefs than you had going in. You sign the clinic consent form, as you live in a state that offers psychedelic assisted therapy in specialized clinical settings. But did you really understand what you agreed to?
As psilocybin, ketamine, MDMA, and other psychedelics move from clinical trials into regulated practice in some states, this question is no longer academic. The philosopher L.A. Paul calls these kinds of experiences “Transformative Experiences”. They are experiences that you can’t truly understand until you’ve had them, either because they can be hard to imagine or because they change who you are fundamentally (including your values, your priorities, or what you care about). Paul’s favorite example of this phenomenon is the experience of becoming a parent. Her concern is simple. If you can’t really imagine what something will be like or if that experience will change the very values you would use to judge it, then how can you rationally decide whether to do it or not?
The usual reply to this challenge is that we consent to the unknowable all the time. Nobody fully knows what a marriage, a new job, or a move abroad will be like. Why should psychedelics be any different? Let’s call this the “benign” view. In response to the “benign” view, some have argued that the unique properties of psychedelic therapy make it drastically different from something like moving or taking a new job. First, many of the life changes I described above unfold gradually, so we can keep checking in and then back out if we need to. If I don’t like a new city, a new job, or a new marriage, I can move, quit, or get a divorce. Whereas, a psychedelic session, even a single session, is an event that some patients rank as among the most meaningful of their lives. It may have lasting effects that can be hard, if not impossible, to undo. Second, we can at least partly imagine a prospective life change like a new job. It’s a lot less clear whether you can imagine the dissolution of your ego: people who have experienced this routinely say words fail them. Third, psychedelic therapy happens inside the confines of a doctor-patient relationship, where the clinician’s duty of care raises the bar for what patients are owed.
So the question remains: can one really consent to a psychedelic experience? It helps to separate two kinds of consent. The basic kind, “valid consent”, requires only that the patient understands, in broad terms, that they are consenting to the administration of the medication and it isn’t an assault. The fuller kind, “substantially informed consent”, is what medical informed consent usually aims for, and requires that the patient understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives well enough to weigh them against their own values.
I’ve argued that patients can give the basic kind of consent for psychedelic therapy, with one catch, but can’t give the fuller form of consent at all. The catch is whether the potential mind-bending experience of psychedelic therapy is merely a side effect of how the psychedelic episode helps patients. If it’s a side effect, a patient who doesn’t grasp the potential intensity of the episode can still provide “valid consent”. But there’s some evidence that the potency of the experience predicts how well people recover from their underlying mental health issue. If the potential distortion of reality a psychedelic may induce is the essence of how the treatment works, then a patient who thinks of it as merely a side effect has misunderstood the basic nature of what they’re agreeing to.
Moreover, the whole point of “substantially informed consent” is to let the patient weigh the potential outcomes of the experience against their intrinsic values. But if the outcome is ineffable or if it may change those values, then no amount of information provided on a consent form is going to bridge that gap. That is, if the “I” who consented to the treatment is a fundamentally different “I” after the treatment, is it possible to say the “I” before the treatment really understood what I was agreeing to?
I am not arguing that psychedelics should not be used as medical treatment. For people with severe, treatment-resistant psychiatric illness, psychedelics may be life-changing in the best sense. But we have an obligation to rethink how we handle consent for these therapies. Psychedelics are here to stay. Before patients undertake psychedelic therapy, we owe them an honest account of what these substances entail.
David Zheng, MD, MSc, MM, graduated with a Master of Science in Bioethics from the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School in 2026. His background is in philosophy (Princeton University, BA), medicine (University of Pennsylvania, MD), and music (Manhattan School of Music, MM). He is currently completing his dual-board residency in Neurology and Psychiatry at NYU where he is chief resident, his Psychoanalytic Fellowship at Columbia University, and is currently finishing up his master’s dissertation on the ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation at The Uehiro Oxford Institute. He will be starting his clinical fellowship training in Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School in 2027.
The Bioethics Blog, hosted by Harvard Medical School Center for Bioethics, features short, conversational pieces from Center alumni and faculty on pressing issues in bioethics. Posts are curated by alumni editors Rebecca Li, Carolyn Baker Ringel, and Risa Jampel. Through these contributions, we aim to share ethical insights, invite further dialogue, and connect bioethicists across the globe working in related areas of research and practice. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School.
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