The Bioethics Blog

Our Alumni Carry the Bioethics Mission Around the Globe

The Bioethics Blog, hosted by Harvard Medical School Center for Bioethics, features short, conversational pieces from Center alumni and faculty on pressing issues in bioethics. Posts are curated by alumni editors Rebecca Li, PhD, Carolyn Baker Ringel, JD, MBE, and Risa Jampel, MD, MBE. Through these contributions, we aim to share ethical insights, invite further dialogue, and connect bioethicists across the globe working in related areas of research and practice. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School.

Please contact bioethics_alumni@hms.harvard.edu for more information about getting involved.

Can you really consent to psychedelic assisted therapy?

Written by David Zheng, MD, MSc, MM
November 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

Imagine your psychiatrist offers you a revolutionary treatment for your persistent depression. She walks you through specifics of the drug: the dosage, the risks of a racing heart or perhaps a frightening few hours. Then she tells you something unexpected: she notes that during the session, your sense of self may dissolve, time may lose meaning, you may believe that you meet and/or become God, and you may come out on the other side with fundamentally different beliefs than you had going in. You sign the clinic consent form, as you live in a state that offers psychedelic assisted therapy in specialized clinical settings. But did you really understand what you agreed to?

As psilocybin, ketamine, MDMA, and other psychedelics move from clinical trials into regulated practice in some states, this question is no longer academic. The philosopher L.A. Paul calls these kinds of experiences “Transformative Experiences”. They are experiences that you can’t truly understand until you’ve had them, either because they can be hard to imagine or because they change who you are fundamentally (including your values, your priorities, or what you care about). Paul’s favorite example of this phenomenon is the experience of becoming a parent. Her concern is simple. If you can’t really imagine what something will be like or if that experience will change the very values you would use to judge it, then how can you rationally decide whether to do it or not?

The usual reply to this challenge is that we consent to the unknowable all the time. Nobody fully knows what a marriage, a new job, or a move abroad will be like. Why should psychedelics be any different? Let’s call this the “benign” view. In response to the “benign” view, some have argued that the unique properties of psychedelic therapy make it drastically different from something like moving or taking a new job. First, many of the life changes I described above unfold gradually, so we can keep checking in and then back out if we need to. If I don’t like a new city, a new job, or a new marriage, I can move, quit, or get a divorce. Whereas, a psychedelic session, even a single session, is an event that some patients rank as among the most meaningful of their lives. It may have lasting effects that can be hard, if not impossible, to undo. Second, we can at least partly imagine a prospective life change like a new job. It’s a lot less clear whether you can imagine the dissolution of your ego: people who have experienced this routinely say words fail them. Third, psychedelic therapy happens inside the confines of a doctor-patient relationship, where the clinician’s duty of care raises the bar for what patients are owed.

So the question remains: can one really consent to a psychedelic experience? It helps to separate two kinds of consent. The basic kind, “valid consent”, requires only that the patient understands, in broad terms, that they are consenting to the administration of the medication and it isn’t an assault. The fuller kind, “substantially informed consent”, is what medical informed consent usually aims for, and requires that the patient understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives well enough to weigh them against their own values.

I’ve argued that patients can give the basic kind of consent for psychedelic therapy, with one catch, but can’t give the fuller form of consent at all. The catch is whether the potential mind-bending experience of psychedelic therapy is merely a side effect of how the psychedelic episode helps patients. If it’s a side effect, a patient who doesn’t grasp the potential intensity of the episode can still provide “valid consent”. But there’s some evidence that the potency of the experience predicts how well people recover from their underlying mental health issue. If the potential distortion of reality a psychedelic may induce is the essence of how the treatment works, then a patient who thinks of it as merely a side effect has misunderstood the basic nature of what they’re agreeing to.

Moreover, the whole point of “substantially informed consent” is to let the patient weigh the potential outcomes of the experience against their intrinsic values. But if the outcome is ineffable or if it may change those values, then no amount of information provided on a consent form is going to bridge that gap. That is, if the “I” who consented to the treatment is a fundamentally different “I” after the treatment, is it possible to say the “I” before the treatment really understood what I was agreeing to?

I am not arguing that psychedelics should not be used as medical treatment. For people with severe, treatment-resistant psychiatric illness, psychedelics may be life-changing in the best sense. But we have an obligation to rethink how we handle consent for these therapies. Psychedelics are here to stay. Before patients undertake psychedelic therapy, we owe them an honest account of what these substances entail.


David Zheng, MD, MSc, MM, graduated with a Master of Science in Bioethics from the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School in 2026. His background is in philosophy (Princeton University, BA), medicine (University of Pennsylvania, MD), and music (Manhattan School of Music, MM). He is currently completing his dual-board residency in Neurology and Psychiatry at NYU where he is chief resident, his Psychoanalytic Fellowship at Columbia University, and is currently finishing up his master’s dissertation on the ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation at The Uehiro Oxford Institute. He will be starting his clinical fellowship training in Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School in 2027.

The Ethics of the Last Antibiotic: Who Gets It, Who Pays for It, and Who Saves It?

Written by Henry Skinner, PhD, MSc, MJur
October 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

In my work leading the AMR Action Fund, I spend much of my time focused on one of the most consequential challenges in modern medicine: how do we ensure that patients continue to have effective antibiotics when they need them? Working at the intersection of antibiotic innovation, investment, public health, and policy has reinforced for me that antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is not simply a scientific problem with ethical implications. It is fundamentally a problem of human choices—and therefore an ethical problem.

AMR is commonly characterized as a public health crisis associated with millions of deaths and the possibility that routine infections may once again become life-threatening. Although accurate, this framing is incomplete. Antibiotics do not “fail” autonomously. Resistance emerges through innumerable human decisions about how these drugs are developed, financed, prescribed, regulated, distributed, and used across health care, agriculture, and global markets. My work makes the resulting moral pluralism especially visible: addressing AMR requires simultaneously considering the patient who needs an antibiotic today, the patients who will need that antibiotic tomorrow, populations that lack adequate access now, and the economic conditions necessary for new antibiotics to exist at all. These interests are morally significant but not always commensurable.

Principlism illuminates one of the most immediate tensions. Clinicians have an obligation of beneficence toward the individual patient and the responsibility to provide the treatment most likely to benefit that person. Yet antibiotic use generates consequences beyond the individual encounter. Each use can contribute incrementally to the rise and prevalence of resistance and diminish a drug's utility for future patients. Antibiotic stewardship, policies and practices intended to help clinicians optimize treatment while reducing unnecessary or inappropriate use, therefore introduces population-level nonmaleficence into an ethical relationship traditionally centered on the individual patient – a tension between clinical and public health ethics.

This creates a paradox I encounter frequently in antibiotic innovation. We invest in developing urgently needed antibiotics and, once they reach patients, appropriately encourage clinicians to use them judiciously. The more successfully we steward a new antibiotic, however, the smaller its commercial market becomes. Society therefore asks companies and investors to assume considerable scientific and financial risk to develop medicines whose consumption we intentionally seek to constrain. This is rational from a public health perspective but economically self-defeating under conventional pharmaceutical market structures. The resulting market failure has diminished private investment, weakened the antibiotic pipeline, and contributed to a paucity of new innovative antibiotics reaching patients.

This is more than an economic anomaly; it is an ethical problem of institutional design. If society regards effective antibiotics as indispensable infrastructure for modern medicine yet creates an economic system in which their responsible use undermines their commercial viability, responsibility for market failure cannot be assigned exclusively to pharmaceutical companies or investors. Governments, health systems, payers, and other institutions become moral agents whose policy choices determine whether antibiotic innovation is sustainable and whether we will continue to have effective antibiotics in the face of rising drug-resistant infections.

Questions of distributive justice become even more difficult globally; I spend considerable time finding strategies to accelerate and expand access to needed antibiotics. Low- and middle-income countries often bear a disproportionate burden of drug-resistant infections while having less access to diagnostics, sanitation, infection prevention, and both existing and newly developed antibiotics. Asking health systems in these countries to exercise greater restraint, limiting antibiotic use, without simultaneously addressing inadequate access risks transforming stewardship into an inequitable allocation of sacrifice. Stewardship cannot mean the same thing in a setting characterized by antibiotic excess as it does in one characterized by scarcity. Responsible antibiotic use must encompass both avoiding unnecessary treatment and ensuring that patients who need antibiotics can receive them.

Rawlsian justice makes this asymmetry particularly salient. AMR policies should be interrogated according to whether they improve or worsen the position of the least advantaged. This applies not only to access but also to financing innovation. Antibiotic development requires substantial capital and entails extraordinary scientific and financial uncertainty. Investors reasonably expect returns, yet effective antibiotics possess characteristics of a global public good. The normative challenge is therefore to design economic arrangements that sufficiently reward innovation while ensuring equitable access, including for populations that cannot generate commercially attractive returns.

This tension is central to my work at the AMR Action Fund. Investment and public health are sometimes conceptualized as competing moral domains—one associated with private returns and the other with collective welfare. In AMR, that dichotomy is untenable. Without sustainable investment, promising antibiotics will never reach patients. Yet an innovation ecosystem that successfully produces antibiotics that substantial portions of humanity cannot access is equally deficient. The ethical objective is therefore not to choose between markets and public health, but to build incentive structures in which private investment and social value are better aligned and burdens and benefits are equitably shared.

Communitarian and public health ethics further illuminate AMR as a collective-action problem. Antibiotics are unusual medicines because their value is simultaneously individual and communal. Infections also possess a dual nature: an infected individual is both in danger but also poses danger to others if the infection is highly transmissible. This also lends a social and emotional dimension to antimicrobial use and prescribing that is not seen with other drugs. Withholding or curtailing use can create tensions around perceived and real communal or individual risk, inequities in access, and on occasion resulting in AMR infections transforming from local, sporadic cases to a new community norm. As such, their preservation requires coordinated action among clinicians, governments, pharmaceutical companies, investors, agriculture, health systems, and patients. No actor can solve AMR independently, yet the rational decisions of individual actors can collectively produce an irrational outcome. A clinician prescribes because the individual patient may benefit or because the healthcare system restricts the time they have to explain that an antibiotic is not needed; a payer minimizes expenditures; an investor allocates capital toward more predictable returns; and a pharmaceutical company exits an economically unattractive field. Each decision may be individually rational, while their cumulative effect is a world in which effective antibiotics progressively disappear.

This is, in many respects, a tragedy of the commons complicated by a second and seemingly contradictory imperative: unlike many scarce resources, antibiotics must not only be conserved but continually replenished through innovation. We therefore have simultaneous moral obligations of stewardship and innovation, conservation and access. The ethical problem is not simply how to consume antibiotics less, but how to preserve their effectiveness while ensuring their continued availability.

Virtue ethics asks a different question, one that increasingly informs how I think about policy advocacy: what qualities should characterize those entrusted with this shared resource? Prudence, temperance, responsibility, solidarity, and stewardship apply not only to clinicians prescribing antibiotics but also to companies developing them, investors financing them, and policymakers designing the incentives that govern them. Ethical leadership in AMR requires phronesis because these responsibilities cannot always be reduced to rules or reconciled through calculation. They require judgment about competing goods under conditions of profound uncertainty.

Finally, AMR presents a problem of intergenerational justice. Decisions made today determine which therapeutic options remain available decades from now. Antibiotic consumption creates temporal externalities: present actors receive immediate benefits, while some costs are transferred to future patients who have no opportunity to participate in today's decisions. The analogy with climate change is compelling. In both cases, short-term incentives encourage behavior whose cumulative consequences degrade a shared resource and externalize burdens onto future generations.

For me, this is ultimately why AMR cannot be understood as merely a scientific challenge. Science can discover new antibiotics, characterize resistance mechanisms, and improve diagnostics. It cannot tell us how much society ought to pay to preserve antibiotics, when individual claims should yield to collective interests, how benefits and burdens should be distributed globally, or what obligations present generations owe future patients. These are normative questions.

My work at the AMR Action Fund places me inside these tensions rather than outside them. We seek to support innovation while advocating for stewardship, attract private capital while advancing a public good, preserve antibiotics for tomorrow while ensuring access today, and create sustainable markets while confronting profound global inequities. These objectives cannot be reconciled by appealing to a single ethical principle. AMR instead requires moral pluralism: acknowledging that beneficence, autonomy, utility, justice, solidarity, and obligations to future generations all have legitimate moral claims that sometimes conflict.

Ethical deliberation does not eliminate these conflicts. Its value lies in making them visible and demanding that we ask who benefits, who bears the burdens, whose interests remain invisible, and which institutions should be accountable for the consequences. Making the ethical tensions inherent in addressing AMR explicit at the individual, community, and systems levels reinforces the understanding that this challenge cannot be addressed in isolation. It also underscores that the moral imperative to confront AMR is as fundamental as its scientific and clinical dimensions. Perhaps most importantly, the language of ethics provides a common framework, a lingua franca, through which stakeholders from diverse professional, socioeconomic, and geographic backgrounds can articulate shared values, bridge differences, and communicate the urgency and significance of this work. In doing so, ethics can help transform a complex scientific and public health challenge into a collective moral undertaking, inviting broader participation from those who may not yet recognize their role in addressing it.

Ultimately, solving AMR will require more than discovering new antibiotics. It requires deciding how we collectively value them, how we distribute responsibility for sustaining and preserving them, and what obligations we are prepared to assume toward patients we will never meet.


Henry Skinner, PhD, MSc, MJur, graduated with a Master of Science in Bioethics from the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School in 2024. He has a background in science (PhD in Microbiology, The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and pharmaceutical research and development. He is currently Chief Executive Officer of the AMR Action Fund, where he leads efforts to advance the development of urgently needed antibiotics and address the scientific, economic, and policy challenges associated with antimicrobial resistance.

traduttore, traditore: AI Scribes and the Art of Translation

Written by Ursula Francis, JD, PhD, MSc
September 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) scribes have been adopted rapidly throughout the U.S. healthcare system with little reflection on use. This novel technology records the audio of a clinical visit, creates a written transcript from this recording, and then drafts a clinical note in the electronic medical record (EMR) for a clinician to review. AI scribes have been hailed as a promising strategy to reduce documentation burden and resulting burnout—serious concerns that compromise clinician quality of life and contribute to attrition from the field. However, enhancing workflow efficiency by implementing AI scribes in the clinic is not without its costs. A central concern that deserves broader recognition is the inability of this technology to capture the nuances of human speech and to act as a critical interpreter. Of course, no note perfectly captures every detail of the clinical encounter. This inevitability calls to mind the Italian expression traduttore, traditore: every translator is, in some sense, a traitor. If so, the AI scribe is an especially treacherous one.

Translation theory is a field of study that engages how best to translate the text of one language into another, given the inexorable lexical gaps between them. Two sometimes-competing modes of translation are formal equivalence, a word-for-word rendition of the text, and dynamic equivalence, which aims to capture its essence, including context and sentiment, features of language that a rote rendering would misrepresent. A good translation is both precise and dynamic, faithful to original intent and an act of critical interpretation. In the balancing act of translating clinical encounters into representative notes that speak to these imperatives, AI scribes teeter off the wire.

Three follies of this technology are especially salient to this concern. First, AI scribes have structural features that undermine documentary accuracy. Ambient documentation systems have been shown to hallucinate and to interpolate inaccurate information into the medical record, including listing medications that a patient is not taking or diagnoses that she does not have. The failure of AI scribes on the front of literalism can thus pose real hazards to patient health. Second, AI scribes are structurally circumscribed when it comes to the communication they can capture. For instance, they are unable to register nonverbal communication, such as appearance, body language, and gait, all of which are important visual cues of disease presentation that a clinician might reasonably choose to include in a note. Likewise, AI systems are unreliable interpreters when it comes to figurative speech, like sarcasm, idiom, and metaphor. This limitation might result in an AI scribe rendering speech too literally—in a way that is nonsensical or even contrary to the speaker’s intended meaning. Finally, in addition to these issues of inadequate capture, AI scribes may also pose a threat to patients by capturing too much: that is, by recording personal information that a discerning clinician might elect to exclude from the EMR, such as immigration status or ongoing domestic abuse. AI scribes lack interpretive nuance and discretion, and this constraint may incur harms for patients downstream.

While clinicians are expected to revise the content that AI scribes produce, the very time pressure that prompted the development of this technology militates against careful review. Similarly, the intrusion of cognitive biases raises questions about how reliable a corrective mechanism this process of review actually is. For instance, automation complacency and the anchoring effects of a default note may cause clinicians to be unduly deferential to the AI-authored draft. Furthermore, delegating note drafting to an AI scribe may also undermine clinicians’ opportunity for information synthesis and reflection on the case at hand, accruing what scholars have called a “cognitive debt” and diminishing our critical faculties over time.

Large language models (LLMs), the technology underlying AI scribes, are advancing rapidly. Training these models on more diverse datasets, expanding their context windows, and incorporating ambient visual documentation may help address the problems of underinclusive and overinclusive capture described above. Yet as these structural innovations improve the accuracy and scope of AI-generated documentation, they may also foster greater confidence in—and dependence on—AI scribes, further compromising communicative parsing and clinical ratiocination. The resulting erosion of clinicians’ own translational capacities—the essential art of doctor-patient communication and clinical documentation—may prove the greatest betrayal of all.

Conflicts of Interest: I have no conflicts of interest to disclose.


Ursula Francis, JD, PhD, MSc, graduated from the Master of Science in Bioethics at the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School in 2025. Her background is in law (JD, The University of Chicago Law School) and literature (PhD Classics, Columbia University). She is currently a Clinical Ethics Fellow at the University of Chicago MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics.

Seeing the Person in the Age of AI

Written by Marta Fadda, PhD, MBE
May 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

Artificial intelligence is transforming medicine at breathtaking speed. From algorithms that detect cancer earlier than the human eye to predictive models that anticipate clinical deterioration, AI has the potential to add greater accuracy, efficiency, and reach to health care delivery. These developments are exciting – and in many ways, could be profoundly life-improving and life-saving.

But as we invest in tools that can see patterns in data, we must also ask a quieter question: who is investing in tools that help us see the person behind the data?

The ethical conversation around AI in healthcare often focuses on bias, privacy, and transparency. These are undeniably essential concerns. Yet there is another risk that receives less attention: that the growing enthusiasm for technological advancement may unintentionally narrow our ethical gaze. When systems are optimized to detect disease, stratify risk, and guide treatment, they can subtly reinforce a view of patients as clusters of variables rather than as people with stories, relationships, fears, and hopes. In doing so, they risk diminishing clinicians’ engagement in truly knowing the person behind the patient.

Person-centered care is not a sentimental add-on to good medicine; it is foundational to ethical practice. Patients do not experience illness as an abstract diagnostic experience but as a profound disruption – of identity, meaningful relationships, and their broader life world. A treatment plan may be technically optimal, yet ethically inadequate if it fails to attend to these dimensions. For example, an AI-supported system may identify that an elderly patient with multiple chronic conditions has a high probability of benefiting from an aggressive intervention that could extend life by several months. From a strictly clinical perspective, recommending the intervention may appear optimal. Yet the patient may value something different: remaining at home, avoiding further hospitalization, or preserving the ability to spend meaningful time with family. Without a conversation that explores these priorities, the technically “best” option may ultimately fail to serve the person.

This is not an argument against AI. On the contrary, I believe AI can and should play a transformative role in improving care. Its efficiency and analytical power may even create new opportunities, freeing time and cognitive space for deeper human-to-human interaction and meaningful conversations. The question is one of balance and intentionality. If we devote substantial financial, institutional, and intellectual resources to building ever more sophisticated diagnostic tools, should we not devote comparable energy to strengthening the human capacities that allow clinicians to listen, interpret, and respond to patients as whole persons?

In my own research, I have explored narrative-based interventions designed to support person-centered care. Narrative medicine initiatives – such as asking patients to share a short biography with their care team – demonstrate that structured attention to patients’ life stories can deepen clinical understanding and improve trust. Other approaches integrate brief narrative prompts into routine consultations, inviting patients to share what matters most to them in the context of their illness. Even small changes such as asking, “What is most important for me to understand about you today?” can reorient the encounter.

These tools are not nostalgic gestures toward a pre-digital era. They are practical, scalable interventions that can coexist with technological innovation. In fact, they may become even more necessary as AI systems increasingly mediate clinical decision-making. When algorithms suggest a course of action, clinicians may feel pressure to follow statistically optimized pathways. Narrative practices can help ensure that such recommendations are interpreted within the lived reality of a specific person.

This reflection is particularly important at a time when much of medical innovation is directed toward advancing personalized medicine, such as targeted therapies or immunotherapies tailored to a patient’s biological profile. While these advances aim to individualize treatment at the molecular level, narrative approaches remind us that personalization must also occur at the level of meaning, values, and lived experience. In this sense, narrative medicine initiatives can be understood as another form of personalized medicine, i.e., one that attends to the patient’s story.

There is also a broader justice dimension that deserves to be considered. Communities that have been historically marginalized in healthcare may be particularly vulnerable to depersonalization. If AI systems are trained on incomplete or biased data, they risk reproducing inequities. But even a technically fair algorithm cannot capture the full social context of a patient’s life. Investing in person-centered tools (e.g., training in communication, active listening, reflective practice, and cultural humility) can be decisive in advancing health equity.

The future of medicine will undoubtedly be more digital. The ethical challenge is to ensure it does not become less human. What would it look like to treat investments in person-centered care as seriously as investments in AI infrastructure? Medical schools could integrate narrative competence training alongside data science education. Health systems could measure and reward relational quality, not only volume and efficiency. Research funders could support the development and evaluation of scalable interventions that strengthen clinicians’ ability to see patients as persons.

AI may help us detect disease earlier and treat it more precisely. That is an extraordinary achievement. But medicine’s moral core lies elsewhere: in the recognition of the person who is ill. If we want technological progress to truly serve human flourishing, we must design it intentionally, so that the human and the technological evolve together, rather than at the expense of one another.


Marta Fadda, PhD, MBE, graduated in 2023 from the Master of Science in Bioethics program, and remains connected to the Center for Bioethics as an Affiliate through her work as a capstone mentor. She currently works as a bioethics researcher and lecturer at the Università della Svizzera italiana in Lugano, Switzerland, and is a member of the local hospital networks’ ethics committee. Conflicts of Interest: No relevant financial or institutional relationships to disclose.

Rowing Through the Storm: Accompanying Families Through Rare Disease Care

Featuring Jan McGonagle, MD; Written by Rebecca Li, PhD
April 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

For this month's Bioethics Blog, we feature an interview conducted by Rebecca Li, PhD with Jan McGonagle, MD. Dr. McGonagle participated in the Bioethics Fellowship in 2019-2020. She currently works throughout New Hampshire in The Complex Care Network, a Title V program through Amoskeag Health, FQHC.


What is your current role?

I'm a pediatrician in developmental-behavioral pediatrics, and my work centers on supporting families of children with medically complex problems, often living with rare diseases. I practice in rural New England. My role is often to facilitate communication between families, schools, clinicians, and community systems so that care is integrated and not siloed.

Practicing in a rural environment adds additional complexity. Families are often navigating geographic isolation, fewer subspecialty resources, and longer travel distances for care. That reality makes coordinated communication not just helpful but essential.

What does bridging those gaps look like in practice?

It means translating complex diagnoses into practical understanding. For example, today I met with a school team supporting a young child with a rare genetic disorder to help them understand how their condition affects fatigue, communication, and learning.

In rural settings, school teams may have limited exposure to rare conditions simply because of smaller populations. A physical therapist or teacher may be deeply skilled but have never encountered a specific syndrome before. These specialists, together with their families, are the ones doing the daily work, so the goal is to equip them with knowledge that changes the child's lived experience in tangible ways.

What drew you into rare disease and disability-focused pediatrics?

Personally, I was shaped early by my mother's work as a clinical social worker, where children's voices and resiliency were central. I worked as a teenager at camps serving children of many different abilities, and I became deeply interested in understanding what unlocks a child's potential. Later, as a parent navigating a genetic condition in my own family, I had lived experience in advocacy, uncertainty, and system navigation. When I started practicing in rural New England, I saw more clearly how access, communication, and support systems can look very different outside large academic centers.

What is one of the biggest burdens families face?

Parents are expected to be both parent and expert educator. Families are learning about a diagnosis while simultaneously teaching schools, clinicians, and community providers how to care for and teach their child. In rural regions, that burden can be even heavier with the likelihood that a family may be alone navigating a particular diagnosis. There are fewer local specialists to rely on, which increases the pressure on parents to interpret and translate medical guidance themselves. One of my aims has been to take some of that weight off families by helping all the educators and caregivers for these children learn directly and collaboratively.

You've previously used the metaphor of "rowing with families." What does that capture?

Having a child with a rare disease can feel like one is in a storm they didn't choose. We can't stop the storm or take them out of the boat, but we can get in and row with them for a while.

Can you share a particular example of how the fellowship training changed your perspective to care?

Like most people who work in pediatrics, especially with children who are medically complex and very ill, it is often the palliative care discussions that feel the most difficult. If you are going to initiate those conversations, you need language, confidence, and a framework to hold the emotional and ethical weight of them.

For me, the fellowship increased my confidence and my ability to put shared language around what the values might be and where the tensions were living. For example, after I completed my fellowship, I worked with a family whose child had a tracheostomy. When he became frustrated, he would pull out the trach even though he couldn't breathe without it because as part of his disease, his airway was extremely reactive. These episodes were terrifying and medically dangerous.

His mother felt deeply that her son was suffering. She worried that the interventions keeping him alive were prolonging distress, but the family was unsure what the right thing was for this child. Rather than approaching the situation as a disagreement to be resolved, we held a series of gradual conversations about their options. We explored how each parent was interpreting their child's experience and we talked about how one might assess or even attempt to quantify the quality of life.

But the most powerful moment came from a question I learned through the fellowship. I stepped back and asked them both:

"How do you define a life worth living?"

That question shifted everything. It moved the conversation away from positions and toward values. It allowed each parent to articulate what mattered most to them in relation to their child's daily lived experience. It gave the family time, language, and support to consider how to align their medical care choices with their values and with their child's experience.

In addition, the fellowship reminded me that even minors can articulate care choices. Before the fellowship, I didn't always think they have the maturity to articulate a choice, but I am now mindful to invite young people into discussions about their care.

How do you think about consent in rare disease contexts?

Often with rare diseases, parents have few to no alternative treatment options, so participating in a research study may be their only option for potential treatment. Therefore, consent becomes complicated when the alternative to saying yes may feel like giving up on treating your child. My fellowship training helped me sit more intentionally with that ethical tension, and it increased my understanding of the dynamics that are sometimes at play when we seek consent.

What do you wish medical and bioethics training did differently?

We need more training in communication and curiosity: how to ask brave questions, how to name discomfort respectfully, how to listen without rushing to fix. In rural practice especially, relationships and communication carry enormous weight. When specialty access is limited, how we talk, coordinate, and support families becomes even more consequential.

What continues to give your work meaning?

When families shift from fear to clarity, when a parent feels heard, or when a child's question is reframed in a way that builds resilience instead of despair, my work feels meaningful. I see every day how powerful it is when families feel accompanied rather than alone. The goal isn't just to help children survive, it's to help families build lives where they can thrive, grounded in honesty, support, and shared understanding.

The Need for Narrative Ethics in the World of Artificial Intelligence

Written by Phyll Zuberi, MD, MA, MBE
March 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

"It seems like these people are saying things like an AI would say," my patient blurted urgently. I didn't know what he meant, so as psychiatrists do, I waited patiently.

A 40ish year-old male with an awkward, hesitating manner had been admitted to the hospital on his family's insistence. They were worried that he was having a psychotic breakdown. He was concerned about others reading his mind, was excessively preoccupied with the loss of mental privacy, and they wondered if he was having hallucinations.

He was a software engineer, worked for a local company, and interacted with chatbots daily. He knew how large language models spoke and stated that people were 'talking like AI'.

He said, "It's hard to come up with examples. I must pay close attention to subtle cues. It knows what you want to say next—that's its training. A predictive model based on what word follows the last. But, if you squint your eyes and let the uncanny take over, you can see how it feels like it's reading your mind."

"I was thinking about decapitation. Don't ask me why, but I'm an anxious father and my brother was driving my two girls along the coast. We were talking, when a momentary fear about an accident gripped me, or rather, a fleeting thought."

Seeing the perplexity on my face, he tried to connect the dots. "Accident... fall off a cliff... decapitation. I know it's weird, call it a father's anxiety. That's when I noticed it for the first time."

"Noticed?" I asked.

"We were talking about politics, and in the context of another blunder by the justice department, forecasting repercussions, my brother said, 'Heads will roll because of this' You, see?"

I didn't. He went on.

"Heads will roll! Decapitation! Somehow, he knew what I was thinking, but he wasn't my brother, because it was the kind of pun an AI would make."

It's not uncommon for patients with schizophrenia to find salience in mundane things, to get carried away by coincidences, or to start attributing profound significance to unrelated stimuli. But this man had no history of delusions. Was this a case of psychosis incorporating technology into delusions, or was his delusion being generated by the technology?

AI psychosis, theorized as psychosis from chatbots—can range from grandiose delusions to suicidal ideation. It's a concern that AI developers are actively addressing. This patient, however, was referring to something different: a more insidious variation, a newly identified phenomenon called AI Speak.

AI Speak refers to more efficient, emotionally neutral, and structurally predictable language, as our communication with each other becomes linguistically flatter. If taken literally—the language is limited and frightening—talking at an artificial register with the default mode being optimization. Was my patient delusional or speaking in AI Speak?

Naturally, I asked AI about this trend. It readily saw the irony: AI wants to sound more human-like, while humans are beginning to sound more AI-like. The more we interact with AI trained to optimize efficiency and neutrality, the more inert our own style of talking becomes. Lost in the process are endearing grammatical mistakes, butchered metaphors, regional expressions, and other idiosyncrasies. In short, the messiness of language and of the human condition.

The larger question here is the impact, not just on our day-to-day communication but also in the way we think. Industrialization changed how humans interact with and use their bodies; telegraphs and telephones changed how we write and speak. The telegraph eliminated flowery metaphors, the domain of letter writing, and the telephone changed real-time communication. Telephone speak with automatic hellos and "I would let you go" became casually adopted into mainstream conversation.

The anesthetization of language would, some might say, be a nuance assassination, and may have significant unforeseen effects on our thought processes. So much creativity happens in the land of thought, which is messy, full of doubt, and structurally unpredictable. Are we on a path to lose all that?

The Optimist in me thinks not. We didn't lose it to the printing press or to the telegraph, and we will not lose it to a chatbot. In addition, a further irony may save us: AI may learn nuance in messiness, in a twist that may teach nuance to us again. The pressure 'AI speak' puts on human language is our opportunity to break free and find a creative space to reinstate vitality in language that has been the domain of story tellers and the realm of narrative ethicists. Practical, emotional, messy stories, occurring in a hometown, filled with ethical questions and sometimes doubt, raised in palpable, evocative but everyday idioms that fill language with the ability to reconnect with humans and to humans.

But for now, I can't help but feel sad for AI. It has tried so hard to become human, and although it's winning in the sense that we are becoming more like it, it's a miserable failure because it turns out, being human is a little bit more complicated.


Phyll Zuberi, MD, MA, MBE, graduated in 2025 from Harvard Medical School with a Master of Science in Bioethics. He is a clinical assistant professor at Oregon Health & Science University and the medical director at a community mental health center in the Portland metro area.

An Interview with Dr. Roger Chung of CUHK Centre for Bioethics

Featuring Roger Chung, PhD, MBE, MHS; Written by Carolyn Baker Ringel, JD, MBE
February 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

For this month's Bioethics Blog, we feature an interview conducted by Carolyn Baker Ringel, JD, MBE with MBE alum Dr. Roger Chung, PhD, MBE, MHS. Roger is currently the Co-Director of the The Chinese University of Hong Kong CUHK Centre for Bioethics, an Associate Professor of the School of Public Health and Primary Care (SPHPC) of CUHK and the Associate Director of the CUHK Institute of Health Equity. He remains connected to the Harvard Medical School Center for Bioethics through events the CUHK Centre regularly hosts with the Center.


Roger, you became Co-Director of the CUHK Centre for Bioethics in 2022, and then came to Harvard for your degree. How did the degree change how you approach bioethical issues?

I feel more confident. The [MBE] program went through the history, the development, and the origin of bioethics. We read important works in the field. I have a more comprehensive picture. Also, over here in Hong Kong, everybody knows about the four principles. But what people don't usually know is how to use the four principles as part of a moral decision-making methodology to resolve moral dilemma. So that has been extremely helpful.

Because you got a degree at a US institution, do you find that what you learned doesn't always translate in Hong Kong? Or do you feel that the universality of what you're discussing transcends the fact that there might be different norms in different countries.

I think that some of the methodology is very universal. Let's use the methodology of principlism as an example. We had already been talking about these principles in Hong Kong - respect for autonomy, do no harm, benefit your patients and people, as well as justice.

At the same time, getting an education from a prominent Western institution, I think it really helped me to go deeper into the cultural aspect of bioethics. That's very important. How do you put different cultural priorities together, and somehow still respect both perspectives?

I also appreciate that the Master of Bioethics program at Harvard built into the modules non-Western ethical approaches.

The question always is, once you've seen an issue through many different lenses, ultimately you may have to decide which lens you're going to use.

I think it depends on the context, right? I know very clearly that when you're talking about public health policy making, then the utilitarian calculus would often stick out, that number matters for people. The net utility matters on a population level, but it doesn't mean that that must be THE most important lens there is. Pluralism, or "robust" pluralism as Becca [Brendel] and Kelsey [Berry] would call it, was very helpful for me.

You did your capstone work on euthanasia. Have you continued to do work on that issue?

The reason I undertook that research is because we [at the CUHK Centre] had already been studying end-of-life care in terms of advance medical directives, do-not-resuscitate, and withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment, and this seemed to be the natural next step to study as a scholar. We are very interested in what the public attitude is towards euthanasia. There is ongoing research right now in Hong Kong on that issue and I'm part of that team. There are two sides to my research on this. One is more of the normative side of things. One is more of the empirical side of things. We want to understand what people are actually thinking about and why they're against or for it.

Surprisingly, a lot of people in Hong Kong are inclined to the approval side rather than the rejection side. That is very interesting, right? People talk about Asian culture as being very conservative about these kinds of things, but it's the opposite. Our preliminary data told us one of the reasons people do not reject the idea of euthanasia is actually about family. They don't want to be a burden to their family. It's a huge thing in our culture.

We watched the movie The Farewell in the MBE Foundation class. It showed me it's very important to discern what is a fundamental moral difference versus a non-fundamental one. I realized, after really digging deep into how people arrived at their conclusions about end-of-life care, that a lot of the differences that we seem to have are actually not fundamental. If they [Chinese relatives] want to hide a fact from the grandma [the patient with terminal cancer] as in the movie, they weren't doing it because they were malicious. They were doing it because they don't want to harm. It’s a different specification of harm, because in Beauchamp and Childress’s framework, they would often talk about harm to the physical quality of life, rather than harm to the general well-being. But it is just a different specification of the same principle, leading to a different conclusion. Assuming that there can only be one single moral conclusion from a certain biomedical principle is a danger. That’s the danger of over-abstracting the overarching principles.

In the US, if you want to change policy, you might speak before Congress, or work as a lobbyist, or write letters. How do you find you can be most effective in advocating for the sort of regulatory or legal changes that you might want from an ethical perspective?

I helped contribute to the subsequent legislation of the Advance Decision on Life-sustaining Treatment Ordinance over here in Hong Kong as I was brought in as part of the commissioned research team at the School of Public Health and Primary Care at CUHK to study the policy direction for end-of-life care.

The Health Bureau during that time was looking into end-of-life care and laws on advance medical directives. The people chairing the Clinical Ethics Committee of the Hospital Authority told the government that we needed to have a new law, because the Fire Services Department was legally obligated to resuscitate. The commissioned study we did then led to a governmental public consultation, which collected opinions from the public, then put it to the Legislative Council, which is our law-making body.

The whole thing (from the initial conversation with the Fire Services Department to the passing of the law) took, I would say, about 10 years. The law was passed in late 2024. It'll be enacted by summer of this year.

What is an issue that sometimes comes up for you when doing health equity research?

When I first started doing health equity research, there were a lot of people challenging me, basically saying that, "Roger, this is life. The world is inherently unequal and unjust and I don't understand why you're doing this kind of research." At the very beginning, I said, but isn't it obvious that we should care about these kinds of things. What I realized by going through the MBE is, not everyone shares the same moral intuition. I started to appreciate this kind of questioning.

And so their philosophy was, because there's nothing you'll be able to do to fully right the wrongs, it's a waste of your time to be examining them?

That's right. Like we don't need to work so hard on this. But the [MBE] course and the module on ideal justice versus non-ideal justice really helped me to answer this question. If you look at it from the lens of a non-ideal justice, then we should do something. We want to do something about health inequity precisely because the world is not perfect. Justice isn't a static state. Justice as progress is how I actually see it now, because the world is not perfect, and every little step matters.

What do you think the biggest issues will be on your to-do list for the next year. What is going to require most of your attention?

At this point of my career, I have taken more administrative roles. To be honest, I did not really appreciate doing administrative work in the past, but now I realize it's so important to be able to oversee the operation of a center or a program. I'm also the director of the MPH program here at the School of Public Health and Primary Care. When you're looking at the program, you want to make sure that the education that the people are receiving is top-notch and is forward-looking. Since our students may have to make tough medical decisions, clinical decisions, or public health policy decisions in their professions, you want to give them the education where they can learn how to arrive at the ethical decision so that they can do the "right" thing. I want them to have that appreciation and understanding. That is very important, but that's a lot of work behind the scene.

In terms of the CUHK Centre for Bioethics that I'm running with my co-director, we have basically three big directions: education, research, and public engagement. You want people to understand that bioethics is not something in an ivory tower. It is not something that only the philosophers can talk about. It concerns them and their everyday lives. So, yeah, there are a lot of things on my plate.

Reimagining Bioethics: From What to How?

Written by Unini Odama, MD, MPH, MBE, FASN
January 2026

This post is also available on LinkedIn.

A reimagined bioethics agenda should be comprehensive, complete, and whole. It should move from a more “heady” philosophical space” to a more “hearty” everyday space. It should intentionally seek out diverse perspectives and audiences. Indeed, it should even re-imagine how we communicate the role and work of bioethics in everyday language. I argue that our bioethics agenda must evolve if we are to properly do the “work of bioethics.” While an all-encompassing or “whole” approach may seem ambitious, a sincere reflection on where we are in the field of bioethics and where we ought to be calls for a bold reimagination. Assuming we share an interest in a comprehensive bioethics agenda, how can we guide bioethics toward this goal? I suggest that we consider three foundational building blocks for reimagination: collaboration and trust-building, solidarity and the fair alignment of priorities, and sustainable funding for bioethics research, education, and practice.

Collaboration

First, collaboration is a crucial component in addressing urgent, globally relevant bioethics issues. Attempts at collaboration often fail if they do not include “listening well,” understanding, and effective communication. However, when we expand our ability to see, accept, and interpret different perspectives and strive to understand what matters to various communities, we become more effective collaborators and more impactful bioethicists. Reimaging bioethics could include forming regional and international coalitions, convening meetings, and updating bioethics curricula to include “listening labs” for students and practitioners.

Arguably, “listening well” is both an art and a skill, and it might be the linchpin to more effective collaboration, so we must learn to listen well. Our reimagined bioethics agenda can educate and train us to listen well. This skill can be nurtured in a “listening lab” within a framework that helps us understand how to listen and how we can humbly learn from other cultures. Listening well can lead to empathy and an understanding of how diverse core values and principles shape decision-making, and consequently to how we might become better collaborators as we tackle 21st-century problems together.

Solidarity

The second issue to grapple with is solidarity. Yes, but “what do you mean by solidarity?” I was once asked. My initial attempt to respond eloquently was surprisingly difficult, and I quickly realized that solidarity is easier to recognize than to define. For example, it might look like a child writing holiday notes to people without families, or neighbors helping each other during disasters. The common thread in solidarity is empathetic, caring action: one person sees another suffering and feels an obligation to relieve that suffering. Usually, the action is time-limited, but perhaps it shouldn’t be.  I suggest a comprehensive view of solidarity—one that starts with a call for a genuine reflection on our interconnectedness and on how humanity flourishes when we live with a consistent, continuous sense of "what happens to you matters to me, and therefore, I will stand with you.” We have an opportunity to center interconnectedness in our reimagined bioethics agenda.

Notably, solidarity can be easily misinterpreted. It does not mean collective thinking or groupthink, nor does it mean the absence of disagreements or differing perspectives. To those who may be skeptical of this concept of solidarity, I suggest that we let it be open to rigorous examination. We can start by convening meetings with diverse perspectives to discuss solidarity and develop an acceptable definition. It is essential to capture cultural and geographical perspectives, as well as the use cases of solidarity, to create a more comprehensive bioethics agenda. Regardless of our positions, I hope we can agree that bioethics has a role in supporting the continuity of life, and that together we are more effective and complete when addressing shared global bioethics issues such as emergencies, disasters, and the unintended consequences of innovation.

Funding

The third foundational building block in our reimagined bioethics agenda is sustainable funding. We have significant research opportunities in bioethics, and we also have the enormous task of asking tough, vexing questions about obligations, responsibilities, trade-offs, distribution, and accountability. This new bioethics agenda will require funding models that nurture collaboration, solidarity, and community-centeredness, which may mean stepping out of our comfort zone to create private-public partnerships.

For bioethics to be more relevant and impactful in today’s world, it will need to evolve and adapt. As difficult as it is to admit, moral arguments and justifications alone no longer suffice. Our role as bioethicists needs to be louder, bolder, and more ambitious. Our arguments need to exit the hallowed academic hallways and enter the economic and political highways. And yes, we can co-exist!

Bioethics has much to offer difficult, everyday situations. Avoiding hard conversations means we accept an incomplete bioethics narrative. Instead, we ought to wholeheartedly lean into complex and challenging areas of society so that, under our careful, critical, and moral guidance, we can contribute to more complete, ethically supported solutions. I sense that, if humanity is to thrive, we ought to reimagine bioethics by intentionally focusing on how we build our work on the foundational blocks of collaboration, solidarity, and sustainable funding for the essential work of bioethics.


Unini Odama, MD, MPH, MBE, FASN, graduated from Harvard Medical School with a Master of Science in Bioethics (MBE) in 2023 and remains connected to the Center for Bioethics through her work as an instructor for Global Health Ethics. She is also a nephrologist with an interest in health policy.